The Auditor-General’s Report 2/2026 raises serious questions about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project that demand clear answers from the government and a thorough investigation by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC).
The original contract was worth RM9.128 billion for six ships. Following restructuring, the contract value increased to RM11.227 billion for five ships.
That is an increase of RM2.099 billion, despite the reduction of one ship. Malaysians are paying more to receive fewer ships. The government must explain exactly what accounts for this additional expenditure, who approved it and whether taxpayers are bearing the cost of earlier failures.
These figures raise serious concerns about possible misappropriation, procurement irregularities and failures of oversight. They warrant a comprehensive investigation that follows the money and establishes responsibility at every level.
MACC must explain the status and findings of its investigations. In July 2026, Parliament was told that the criminal investigation into the project remained ongoing. Fifteen years after the project’s approval, Malaysians deserve to know when full accountability will be established.
I am convinced that, had a thorough investigation been pursued with urgency and determination, this case could have been “kasi bungkus” five years ago, with those responsible identified and brought to justice. Instead, Malaysians are still waiting for full accountability while costs rise and delivery dates slip.
MACC must examine the procurement decisions, payments, contractual changes and conduct of everyone involved, regardless of rank, position or political affiliation. Wherever the evidence supports prosecution, action must follow.
Meanwhile, taxpayers continue to pay for a project that remains behind schedule. As at 25 June 2026, cumulative payments under the main contract had reached RM8.557 billion. Overall physical progress stood at 78.99 per cent against a target of 86.54 per cent, a shortfall of 7.55 percentage points.
LCS 1 was itself 108 days behind schedule. The audit recorded a contractor proposal to move its physical delivery to 19 April 2027, beyond both the contractual date of 26 August 2026 and the revised December 2026 target.
More troubling is the distinction between physically receiving a ship and receiving its promised combat capability.
The audit warned that outstanding weapons procurement could delay full capability until December 2035 under a replacement procurement scenario. This is a risk identified by the audit, rather than a confirmed completion date, but it requires an immediate and credible response from the government.
If that scenario materialises, 24 years will have passed since the project was approved in 2011. How much will naval technology and the threats facing Malaysia have changed by then?
We ordered an LCS warship. Are we instead going to receive a “Titanic”, impressive in appearance and name, but still lacking the full combat capability promised to the Royal Malaysian Navy?
The Minister of Defence must explain why the ministry would accept physical delivery while training and weapons systems remain incomplete. Is early acceptance justified by the Navy’s operational needs, or is it intended to meet a delivery milestone on paper?
If early acceptance provides operational benefits, the ministry should present the Navy’s assessment to Parliament, subject to national security requirements. It must explain the capabilities available at handover, the operational limitations and the deadline for resolving each outstanding deficiency.
The government must also disclose who will bear the costs of outstanding work, additional maintenance and weapons integration, and whether its contractual rights to compensation remain protected.
A handover ceremony cannot substitute for combat readiness. The government must not announce that a ship is fully ready when its promised capabilities remain incomplete.
Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi must also answer for his political and administrative responsibility as Defence Minister when the project’s early procurement decisions were made.
The earlier investigation record included a Boustead Naval Shipyard letter dated 8 July 2010 bearing his instruction, “SUB Perolehan, sila laksanakan.”
That instruction forms part of the record of his involvement. Zahid must explain the decisions and oversight exercised under his leadership, and how the Navy’s requirements and taxpayers’ interests were protected.
What responsibility is he prepared to accept for the project’s early decisions? What lessons does he acknowledge from the failures that have continued for so many years?
In 2010, the instruction was to proceed. In 2026, Malaysians are still asking when these ships will be available with their full intended capability.
The government must provide a credible delivery and combat-readiness plan, a detailed explanation of the RM2.099 billion increase, and a clear account of the investigations and action taken.
Malaysians deserve functioning warships, value for public money and accountability for those responsible for this prolonged failure.